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Taiwan’s Challenges in the Changing 
Landscape of Regional Security and Economy 
in the Asia-Pacific Region after the Cold War
Abstract
After the Cold War, international politics and economy of the Asia-Pacific region has 
changed tremendously. Regional economic integration accelerates up with the rapid 
increase of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements between regional countries, 
whereas regional security is continually confronted with conflict flashpoints, including 
regional maritime sovereignty disputes. This article provides the recent development of 
regional economy and security with emphasis on maritime disputes in East China Sea 
and South China Sea and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Regional Comprehen-
sive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and discusses the possible challenges to Taiwan in 
these issues.
Keywords: TPP, RCEP, East China Sea, South China Sea, Taiwan, the Asia-Pacific region
Preface
Over two decades, the dynamics of international political and economic interac-
tion in the Asia-Pacific region underwent a huge change. Economic integration in the 
region has increased at an unprecedented rate both in depth and width, especially 
the recent development of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In November 2014, China attempted 
to reinvigorate the process of the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) by 
proposing the Beijing Roadmap in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 
In contrast to the flourishing development of regional economic cooperation and 
integration, regional security is still at high risk of conflict, such as the territorial 
disputes over the East China Sea and the South China Sea. The increasing competition 
between the US and China over the arrangement of regional security and economic 
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order is accelerating regional economic transformations and heating the flashpoints. 
Undoubtedly, Taiwan as an Asia-Pacific country cannot do anything but cautiously 
confront those regional economic and security developments. However, the cross-strait 
relation is a unique and formidable hurdle to face when Taiwan wants to effectively 
participate in those regional developments to maintain its national interests. The 
former Ma Yin-jeou government (2008–2016) of Taiwan attempted to tackle this 
obstacle through closer political and economic relations with China. However, the 
Ma administration’s China policy incurred considerable doubts in Taiwan’s domestic 
society, which triggered the Sunflower Movement that generated a great impact on 
Taiwan’s domestic politics. As a result, the negotiations of economic agreements be-
tween Taiwan and China under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
(ECFA) were then slowed down. The cross-strait relations are further cooled down 
after Taiwan’s Democratic Progress Party took over the office from the Chinese 
Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) in May 2016. The changing dynamics of regional 
relations, cross-strait relations, and domestic political and economic transformation 
brings the new government in Taiwan more pressing challenges in the future. This 
article is to illustrate the current development of the Asia-Pacific region’s security 
and economy, focusing on the East China Sea and the South China Sea issues and 
the TPP and the RCEP. It is followed with discussions on the challenges for Taiwan 
amid such tremendous regional changes and how to deal with them.
The Current Security and Economic Situation  
in the Asia-Pacific Region
 Regional Security: Territorial Disputes of the East China Sea  
and the South China Sea
The East Asia regional seas issue concerns not only the maintenance of the 
sovereignty of the related countries, but it also involves the division of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) and the distribution of the marine resource development. 
Diaoyutai (in Japan: Senkaku islands) is center of the East China Sea disputes 
in which Taiwan, Japan, and China involve. In 1971, the United States and Japan 
reached the agreement to return the Ryukyu Islands to the latter, which entered into 
force in 1972. However, the agreement only transferred the administrative authority, 
rather than the full sovereignty, of Diaoyutai to Japan, leaving controversy over the 
sovereignty of the islands among Taiwan, Japan and China more than 40 years. At 
that time, China and Taiwan respectively made solemn protests about the disposal 
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of the United States mainly through official, diplomatic or civil movements. China 
addressed the Diaoyutai issue by announcing that “we should set aside sovereignty 
disputes and jointly exploit natural resources” instead of launching a fierce debate 
or battle. That was because of considering the development of the bilateral relations 
after the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Japan in 1972. This dec-
laration was mentioned again when the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between 
Japan and China in 1978. However, after the United Nations. Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, China and Japan asserted different principles of 
sea boundary delimitation to claim its EEZ in the East China Sea [Wang Gaocheng, 
2012, pp. 61–63]1. Such diverge renders Diaoyutai which is geographically located 
in the middle line of the East China Sea area between Japan and China a highly cru-
cial place concerning how the boundary of EEZ to be delimited and in turn national 
sovereignty maintenance. As a result, Diayutai became the focus of the East China 
Sea disputes. After the Cold War, China has every now and then put pressure on 
Japan because of the Japanese right-wingers landing on the islands and attempting 
to claim their sovereignty or because of the arrest of the Chinese fishermen entering 
the Diaoyutai territorial sea for fishing by the Japanese government. Although those 
incidents to some extent were escalated to interstate disputes, after the incident had 
calmed down the two countries returned to the policy of putting the maritime disputes 
aside and promoting joint marine development. However, both Japan and China 
recently are incrementally taking tougher actions to maintain its sovereignty, which 
makes the status quo deteriorating. In September 2010, a Chinese fishing boat and 
a Japanese Coast Guard vessel collided in the Diaoyutai waters, causing a diplomatic 
conflict and postponed negotiations on the agreement of joint development in the 
East China Sea [Lin Zhengyi, Chen Hongjun, 2014, pp. 38–39; Diaoyutai Collision…, 
2010]. Since then, China began to send Fisheries Administration Ships to carry out 
regular maritime surveillance around the Diaoyutai waters, showing intensifying 
intervention of China on the issue of the East China Sea [China Sent Boats…, 2010; 
Cai Zengjia, 2012, pp. 43–44]. Faced with changes of China’s policy behavior, Japan 
also turned to take more active policy on Diaoyutai. In April 2012, then governor 
of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, put forward to purchase the ownership of Diaoyutai 
on behalf of Tokyo with organizing the fundraising campaign all over the country. 
This national campaign forced then Joshihiko Noda’s government to make a deci-
sion in September 2012 to buy the ownership of Diaoyutai with the government’s 
1 China advocates the principle of natural extension of the continental shelf, and therefore the 
dividing line of access onexclusive economic sea zone between China and Japan is the Ryukyu Trench; 
while Japan advocates the principle of the middle line division, therefore the middle line of coast distance 
between the two countries is the basic point for demarcation.
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funds, which in fact essentially nationalized Diaoyutai. Japan’s move of Diaoyutai 
nationalization triggered a backlash from China because it was considered a funda-
mental change to the status quo in the East China Sea. Consequently, China not only 
immediately launched diplomatic negotiations with Japan but also took a series of 
counter-measures to maintain sovereignty over Diaoyutai, including the publication 
of Diaoyutai’s territorial baseline, submitting the baseline coordination table and 
a marine chart to the United Nations Secretary-General, continuing maritime surveil-
lance around the islands and holding military exercise in the East China Sea [Wang 
Gaocheng, 2012, pp. 62–65; Lin Zhengyi, Chen Hongjun, 2014, p. 39]. In November 
2013, China announced the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 
intending to further legitimize its sovereignty over Diaoyutai. Recently, China has 
built a military base with monitoring capability and a helipad in the Nanji islands 
which is 300 kilometers northwest of the Diaoyutai islands [James’ Defense…, 2015]. 
In addition to regular air and maritime surveillances and military activities, China 
also increased oil exploration activity in the East China Sea [NIKKEI Zhongwen, 
2015, BBC Zhongwen, 2015]. In 2015, in order to response to the changing security 
environment in East Asia (also as a counteraction to China’s recent assertive actions), 
the Abe Shinzo’s government passed a series of security bills, coordinated with the 
new Guideline for US-Japan Defense Cooperation, allowing Japan’s Self-Defence 
Forces (SDF) with the permission of the Diet to help the US and its allies even if 
Japan is not under attack itself. The interactions between the two countries over 
the Diaoyutai issue continually make their security relations in a high tension, but 
without breakdown.
Similarly, the South China Sea also undergoes disputes as same as that occurred 
in the East China Sea, but it is in more complicate situation because of more territorial 
claimants involved, including Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Taiwan, and Vietnam. Conflicts between Vietnam and China and between the Phil-
ippines and China are most serious. In 1974, Vietnam were in militarized conflict 
with China over over the Paracel Islands which is under China’s control at the end. 
It is followed by China’s control over the Johnson South Reef as a result of sea battle 
between the two countries in 1988. Although China proposed in 1990 that the related 
disputants should conduct joint development in the disputed waters and normalized 
the relations with Vietnam in 1991, it later announced“.
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contigu-
ous Zone” in February 1992, indicating that the Pratas (Dongsha) Islands, the Paracel 
(Xisha) Islands, the Zhongsha Islands and the Spratly (Nansha) Islands in the South 
China Sea are parts of the Chinese territory. In May 1992 China planned to explore 
oil and gas around the Spratly Islands, which caused Vietnam’s protests. In July 1992, 
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the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued “the ASEAN Declara-
tion on the South China Sea” and called for “the code of international conduct over 
the South China Sea” to peacefully settle the disputes. China however continued 
expanding effective control over its claimed territories in the South China Sea. For 
example, China occupied the Mischief Reef in 1995 and announced the Paracel Is-
lands as tourism areas in 1998 and built up a satellite-receiving station in the Paracel 
Islands. All of these activities again sparked strong protests on the part of the Phil-
ippines and Vietnam [Lin Zhengyi, 2012, pp. 91–94]. After a series of protests and 
negotiation, China and the ASEAN worked out in November 2002 the “Declaration 
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” (the DOC), hoping that the related 
parties in disputes could mitigate disagreement through dialogue, jointly maintain 
peace and stability in the region, and at the end establish a binding “Code of Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea” (the COC) to regulate the activities in the South 
China Sea. Although the ASEAN member states and China intended to construct 
confidence-building measures via the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the 
Implementation of the DOC, the strong incentive of sovereignty protection of terri-
torial claimants weakened the efforts of the working group meetings [Lin Zhengyi, 
2012, pp. 104–105; Li Qiongli, 2012, pp. 121–123]2. Especially in recent years, the 
frequency and intensity of sovereignty protection activities of the disputants have 
increased, for example, China sent the largest fishery administration ship to patrol 
the Paracel Islands in 2009, and in the same year the Philippines claimed parts of the 
Spratly islands and the Scarborough Shoal as the Philippines’ territory, while Malay-
sia and Vietnam submitted their continental shelf delimitations to the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). In order to counter the Philippines, 
Malaysia and Vietnam, China put forward a notification to express its objection and 
set up the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs under the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs. Through the Islands Protection Act it had strengthened its legitimacy 
of controlling the South China Sea [China’s Sending Fishery…, 2009; Lin Zhengyi, 
2012, pp. 96–97; Wang Guanxiong, 2012, pp. 258–261]3. In May 2011, Chinese 
marine surveillance ship cut the working cables of the PetroVietnam’s exploration 
ship off the coast of Vietnam, resulting in mutual accusations, and in the same year, 
Vietnam took a military exercise as a response [Vietnam Protested Again…, 2011]. 
2 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea – DOC is a political document, 
not-binding treaty, but can be seen as conflict prevention measures.
3 Under the “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, the coastal states shall report their 
continental shelf boundaries before May 13, 2009 to establish order of the sea world. The claimant coun-
tries of the South China Sea islands and reefs include: China, Vietnam and the Philippines. Malaysia and 
other countries also claimed before the expiry date.
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In April 2012, the Philippines’ warships tried to arrest and detain Chinese fishermen 
and their fishing boats around the Scarborough Shoal but they were prevented by the 
Chinese maritime surveillance ships, also resulting in conflicts between the Philippines 
and China which lasted over a month. After the incident, the Philippines proposed 
to submit the Scarbough Shoal disputes to the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea, but China objected. In September of the same year, the Philippines president 
Benigno Simeon Aquino III promulgated the Execution Order to name a part of the 
Philippines west coast of the South China Sea “the West Philippines Sea” and sub-
mitted the territorial map with the revision to the United Nations [The Philippines 
Named…, 2012]4. While the Scarborough Shoal is in effect under China’s control, 
Manila filed the arbitration application to the Permanent Court of Arbitration on 
22 January 2013 and then submitted the memorial on 30 March 2014, which sparked 
legal as well as political battles between Manila and Beijing [CNA News, 2013; BBC 
Zhongwen, 2014]. At the beginning of May 2014, the China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation moved its rig “HD981” to the sea area which is only 120 miles away 
from Vietnam’s coast, planning the exploration of oil for three months. The move of 
“HD981” into Vietnam’s claimed EEZ and continental shelf was regarded illegal and 
brought about not only standoff and collision of the two countries but also violent 
anti-Chinese protests in Vietnam. Meanwhile, China in the past few years has quietly 
extended land reclamation in massive scale and constructed massive basic infrastructure 
and military facilities on the occupied islands and reefs. For instance, an airstrip was 
built on Fiery Cross Reef and missiles and fighter airplanes have been deployed on 
Woody Island [BBC Zhongwen, 2016; CNA News, 2016a; CNA News, 2016b]. These 
recent events showed that tensions of the South China Sea is incrementally rising. 
From the strategic point of view, China actively legalizes its marine administration 
and expands effective control of the occupied islands in order to its sovereignty claim 
over the South China Sea. On the other hand, China continues bilateral negotiation 
with the claimants as well as other regional countries in order to prevent a united 
front formed in ASEAN and East Asia and then weaken internationalization of 
the South Sea issue. On the contrary, internationalizing the South China Sea issue 
through an international legal system and multilateral channels is mainly intended 
by Southeast Asian claimants. Cooperation with the United States and Japan is also 
taken to counterbalance China’s assertiveness in the sea. For example, the Philippines 
was supported by the U. S. on the South China Sea Arbitration. Meanwhile, it is also 
intensifying military cooperation with Japan, represented in recent participation of 
4 The West Philippines Sea delineated by the Philippines include: Luzon Sea, the waters around, 
in which the Pagasa Island is located and the Scarborough Shoal Island waters.
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Japanese SDF in the Balikatan military exercise in Subic Bay in April 2016. However, 
although the tension is increasing, it is avoided to escalate to the war.
Concerning the U. S. policy to the South China Sea, its policy stance is gradually 
moving from indirect involvement to direct intervention. As to the Diaoyutai issue, 
the United States is against the change of the status quo by either China or Japan. 
Japan’s nationalization of the islands and China’s setting of the ADIZ in the East China 
have crossed the line of the United States. In the previous conflicts between China 
and Japan, the United States keeps recognizing Japan’s administrative authority of 
Diaoyutai and reiterates that the islands is covered by the Treaty of Mutual Cooper-
ation and Security between the US and Japan, while it also explicitly states that its 
security commitment to the regional allies should not be regarded as a support to their 
specific policies which may erode the US regional interests [Secretary Panetta…, 
2012]. After China’s announcement of the ADIZ, the United States also immediately 
sent unarmed B-52 bombers to fly over the identification zone as a response [British 
Media…, 2013]. These actions of the US were taken to constrain behaviors of both 
China and Japan on the Diaoyutai. However, China’s increasingly assertive activities 
has impelled the US to more explicitly support Japan.
On the South China Sea issue, the US also heightens its counterbalance to China. 
Although the US does not take a certain stance to any specific country’s sovereignty 
claim on the islands and reefs in the South China Sea, it on the one hand continuously 
expresses serious concerns to the freedom of navigation and trade and encourages 
the claimants to peacefully resolve maritime disputes through multilateral diplomatic 
consultations and negotiations at many regional multilateral institutions, such as 
the ASEAN-US summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the East Asia Summit. 
On the other hand, the US is actively strengthening and modernizing the regional 
security alliance system [The US Secretary…, 2010]. For example, the US in the 2015 
East Asia summit successfully put the South China Sea issue in the summit agenda 
under China’s considerable resistance and listed the issue in top priority. In addition 
to diplomatic manners, the US also heightened its military counterbalance against 
China by operating the maintenance of navigation freedom in South China Sea with 
regular maritime and aerial surveillances and actively integrating and strengthening 
their military cooperation with the first island chain countries (Japan, the Philippines, 
and Australia) and non-traditional allies, such as Vietnam [The US Military Urged…, 
2014; China Claimed…, 2015; On Check…, 2015; American Defense…, 2015]5.
5 China actively reclaim sea at Johnson South Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Southern Reef and Fiery 
Cross Reef in the South China Sea, in which Fiery Cross Reef is the largest reef and there are also garrison, 
docks, anti-aircraft guns and communiction equipment. See Hardy and O’Connor [2014].
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Regional Economic Integration: The TPP and the RCEP
At the end of the Cold War, the Asia-Pacifi c regional economic integration is 
promptly accelerated. According to the statistics of the Asian Development Bank 
(the ADB) in Figure 1, there have been 144 free trade agreements signed, 69 in ne-
gotiation and 65 proposed6. Th e fi gure shows that the number of Free Trade Agree-
ments (bilateral and multilateral) largely increases aft er 2000. Of those developing 




















Figure 1. Th e Trend of Regional Economic Integration Agreements (1975–2014)
Source: Asian Regional Integration Center, Table 1. FTA by Status (cumulative), Asian Development Bank, 
http://aric.adb.org/ft a (28.01.2015).
APEC, a low-binding regional forum, was expected by the US as the primary 
impetus for institutionalizing regional economic integration, while it however failed 
to achieve the goal because of enormous political and economic diff erences between 
the member states and some member states’ concerns of the US dominance in the 
regional integration process. Since the US worry of being excluded from rising East 
6 The ADB calls FTA as regional economic integration agreement. Since a regional economic in-
tegration agreement includes at least two economic entities, there will be a double count of a country’s 
exact number of FTAs when using the ADB data. As a result, total number of country-wise regional 
economic integration agreements will be more than that of region-wise economic integration agreements 
in Asia. The forming stage of FTV is: I. In Plan: the parties considering of regional economic integration 
agreement establish a joint research group or a joint working group to implement feasibility assessment; 
II. In Negotiation: the parties is negotiating over or finalizing the contents of a preliminary framework 
agreement as a base of future negotiation, or the parties is directly in negotiation without a framework 
agreement; III. Negotiation in Completion: the agreement is signed by the parties and approved by their 
own domestic legislative or administrative authority or enters into force.
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Asian regionalism that designates regional states a driving seat, it has tried to ad-
vance the FTAAP in 2006 but made no meaningful progress at the end. Against this 
background, the US turned to the TPP in September 2008, looking forward to giv-
ing new impetus to free trade liberalization in the APEC as well as maintaining the 
leading position in the regional integration process7. After the US joined the TPP 
negotiation and then became the dominant participant, the membership coverage 
of the TPP quickly expanded. Except for the original member states and the United 
States, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, Canada and Japan joined in one 
after another. Currently, the total GDP of the TPP members as of 2013 occupied 
38% of the global GDP, which speaks itself as a considerable force in the world pol-
itics and economy8. The TPP is a high-quality free trade agreement which involves 
a wide range of trading issues, requires the entire open of domestic market, and 
integrates the regional supply chain. Therefore, the participants have to overhaul 
its own domestic economic and legal systems to accomplish the TPP requirements, 
which may render greater political and economic confrontation at home. In other 
words, the difficulty to finalize the TPP will be much higher [Ye Changcheng, 2014, 
pp. 32–35]. However, under the forceful conduct of the US, all TPP participants has 
reached the final terms of the agreement and signed in April 2016 after 20 rounds 
of negotiations in last five years.
When the United States had been actively promoting the TPP, ASEAN also passed 
the “ASEAN Framework for Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership” during 
the nineteenth ASEAN leaders’ meeting in 2011and then officially launched the RCEP 
negotiations in 2013. ASEAN initiated the RCEP because the levels of liberalization 
of five ASEAN + 1s are incompatible to each other and the ASEAN + 3 and the 
ASEAN + 6 as complementary to the ASEAN + 1s did not effectively push forward 
the regional economic integration as expected, and because the formation of the TPP 
and the China-Japan-South Korea Free Trade Agreement are posing challenge to the 
ASEAN’s driving seat in the regional integration. At the present stage, the RCEP has 
16 member states, including the all ASEAN member states, Australia, China, India, 
Japan, Korea, and New Zealand. Their goal is to integrate the existing commitments 
7 The TPP is originated from the “Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, TPSEP” 
by New Zealand, Singapore, Chile and Brunei in 2005, which is a regional trade agreement connecting 
Asia, the Pacific and Latin America. The idea of TPP was initiated in the background that during the 
1997 Asian financial crisis the US rather intended to push forward the liberalization policy than help the 
affected Asian countries to get out from the crisis in the region, sparking the discontent of Japan, China, 
Korea and the ASEAN countries who later decided to initiate “ASEAN Plus Three, APT” to cope with 
the new regional economic shock.
8 The global share of GDP in the TPP and the following RCEP is counted on the basis of the statistical 
data of the IMF in 2013.
164 Chih-Mao Tang 
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
and resources, based on the five ASEAN +1 s, in order to achieve a higher degree of 
regional trade liberalization and keep ASEAN as the center of the process. The design 
of the RCEP is to enlarge market openness without contravening existing bilateral or 
multilateral FTAs. Because of the differences in the levels of economic development 
between the participants, the RCEP will adopt progressive negotiations, providing 
flexible measures for the relatively under-developed countries, such as a longer ad-
justment period, etc. In other words, the RCEP’s entire openness will be lower than 
that of the TPP. However, the RCEP is a free trade area with a share of nearly 29% of 
global GDP as of 2013, more than 3 billion population, and rich natural resources, 
which renders the RECP a promising market in the world. Moreover, the establish-
ment of the RCEP will exert a profound influence on economic activities of domestic 
and foreign enterprises within and without the RCEP as a result of that the industrial 
connections between ASEAN and Japan, Korea and China is getting than ever.
Challenges to Taiwan
Amid the changing landscape regional security and economy in the Asia-Pacific 
region, Taiwan has to cautiously cope with impacts of the competition between the 
United States and China. Undoubtedly, China’s rise is the primary force transform-
ing international political structure in East Asia after the Cold War. After the three 
generations of development led by Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, China 
has become the world’s largest economy and its military power has risen onto the top 
rank9. On this substantial base, China under Xi Jinping since November 2012 began 
to incrementally demonstrate more ambitious and assertive policy stance to maintain 
national interests in regional security and economic affairs. In order to balance the US 
comprehensive return to Asia, China not only joined ASEAN to promote the RCEP 
but also started several grand economic initiatives, including “one belt (Silk Road 
Economic Belt) and one road (Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century)10, “Beijing 
roadmap” for the FTAAP [APEC, 2014], and the “Asia Infrastructure Investment and 
 9 The IMF in the “World Economic Outlook” issued in October 2014, noted that China will surpass 
the United States as the world’s largest economic entity with 17,600,000,000,000 USD to 17,400,000,000,000, 
when calculated on the basis of Purchasing Power Parity.
10 In September 2013, when Xi Jinping was in four Central Asia countries (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan) for a state visit, he proposed a concept in a speech in Kazakhstan that China 
would cooperate with the Central Asian countries in the construction and development of the “Silk Road 
Economic Belt” (also called “New Silk Road” with a new model). When he visited Indonesia in the same 
year, he put forward that China would strengthen maritime cooperation with the ASEAN countries, by 
creating the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (also called the “New Maritime Silk Road”). After that, 
the initiative of “one belt one road” was formally brought into future key tasks of the Chinese government 
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Development Bank” which is designed to support the “one belt, one road” [China 
Pushes…, 2014]. These initiatives, if successfully implemented, would undoubtedly 
enhance the autonomy and domination of China in the regional affairs.
China’s ambition to lead regional affairs motivated the U. S. to comprehensively 
reconsider and reevaluate the role of Asia in its global strategic layout, represented 
in proposed strategic concepts of “returning to Asia”, “Pivot to Asia” and “Rebalancing” 
in the recent years. In addition to the existing bilateral alliance framework, the U. S. 
also copes with regional security issues by encouraging and involving in the devel-
opment of regional multilateral security mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Regional 
Forum. Meanwhile, the TPP is regarded as an important tool for the U. S. to deepen 
economic with regional allies so as to consolidate its leadership in the region. How 
to maintain autonomy and avoid marginalization in such dynamics of hegemonic 
competition becomes a serious challenge to Taiwan.
On the East China Sea and South China Sea territorial issues, Taiwan is as anx-
ious as other disputants, trying to protect its sovereignty and ensure the freedom of 
navigation and the right of using marine resources. But China’s rising political and 
economic role critically compresses Taiwan’s diplomatic space to address maritime 
issues. The One-China Policy significantly reframes the related parties from further 
cooperation with Taiwan in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. On the 
one hand, these related parties don’t want to deteriorate the relationship with China 
because cooperation with Taiwan on sovereignty-related maritime issues implies 
recognizing Taiwan as independent sovereignty state, which is against One-China 
Policy. On the other hand, the related parties worry of whether Taiwan can firmly 
stand its feet in face of China when China now has certain economic and political 
influence on Taiwan due to the latter’s highly economic dependence to China’s market. 
Therefore, cooperating with China on regional maritime issues may not only risk 
blurring Taiwan’s sovereignty status but also decrease the possibility to cooperate 
with other related parties.
To address the Diaoyutai issue, the former Ma Ying-jeou government of Taiwan 
proposed “the East China Sea Peace initiative” (the ECSPI) in 2012, expecting to re-
solve the Diaoyutai disputes by establishing the East China Sea Code of Conduct11. 
On the South China Sea issue, although Taiwan is the key claimant and supports the 
establishment of the COC, it is still excluded from dialogues and consultations over 
the COC because of China. In this context, Taiwan is rather a passive claimant in the 
in the “Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party” and the 
“The Central Economic Work Conference in 2013”.
11 For the content of ECSPI, please see The R. O. C. Ministry of Foreign Affairs [2012].
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South China Sea. However, on 26 May 2012, the Ma administration government 
proposed “the South China Sea Peace initiative” (the SCSPI), emulating the ECSPI, 
in order to prevent from being marginalized on the South China Sea issue12. From 
strategic point of view, the maritime peace initiatives by the Ma administration are 
intended to pave a way for Taiwan to more effectively participate in regional security 
cooperation. Although the US welcomes the two peace initiatives [Kerry: The East 
China…, 2015; The United States Appreciated…, 2015], it supports Manila’s stance 
in the South China Sea arbitration case, which means that it is against to Taiwan’s 
U-Shape Line in delimitation of South China Sea territory because the U-Shape Line 
overlaps the China’s Nine-Dash line which is opposed in the arbitration case [Lin, 
Cheng-Yi, 2016, pp. 39–47]. On 12 July 2016, the international tribunal of arbitration 
rendered its award for the South China Sea case, refuting the China’s Nine-Dash Line 
and indicating Taiwan’s Itu Aba Island as a ‘rock’ that do not generate an exclusive 
economic zone or continental shelf. This result makes a challenging condition to the 
new Tsai Ing-wen government of Taiwan in dealing with maritime issues. In this re-
gard, Taiwan has to more explicitly show international society that China’s assertive 
behaviors in the South China Sea is not in interest of Taiwan in order to convince 
the other related parties to cooperate with Taiwan in the future. Furthermore, the 
result of the South China Sea Arbitration will possibly affect the future interactions 
between the claimants on the East China Sea issues. The Tsai administration there-
fore must be careful of such chain effects transmitting between the two seas. But 
how to address maritime issues without deteriorating cross-strait relations will be 
a formidable task for the Tsai government.
Apart from the regional security issues, Taiwan is also in risk of being marginalized 
in the Asia-Pacific regional integration process. According to the number of FTAs, the 
Figure 2 shows that Singapore is the most active country participating in the regional 
integration in East Asia with 23 FTAs signed, 10 in negotiation, and 7 in plan. As of 
2014, each East Asian states on average has seven FTAs signed, six in negotiation, 
and eleven in plan, while Taiwan currently has only two FTAs in negotiation and four 
in plan, far less than regional average, even though seven FTAs signed. Compared with 
South Korea, a major competitor to Taiwan in the international economic market, 
the number of South Korea’s FTAs is two folds of Taiwan’s. The empirical data here 
shows that Taiwan is in difficulties of signing FTAs.
12 For the content of SCSPI, please see The R. O. C. Ministry of Foreign Affairs [2015].
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Figure 2. The Distribution of East Asian FTAs by Country (2014)
Source: Asian Regional Integration Center, Table 6. FTA Status by Country/Economy, 2014, Asian Development 
Bank, http://aric.adb.org/fta (28.01.2015).
Since Taiwan is an export-led economy, the formation of the TPP or the RCEP 
in the future will definitely affect Taiwan’s competing position in the new wave of 
the Asia-Pacific regional integration. According to the statistics of Taiwan’s Bureau 
of Foreign Trade, during the period of 2003–2013, the TPP member states in annual 
average accounted for about 32% of Taiwan’s total exports and about 43% of total 
imports. Of the TPP member states, the United States, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia 
and Australia are major trade partners of Taiwan. In the same period, the RCEP 
member states in annual average accounted for Taiwan’s exports and imports by 68% 
and 57%, which indicates that Taiwan’s trade relations with the RCEP member states 
are much closer than with the TPP member states. China (including Hong Kong and 
Macao), ASEAN (particularly Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, and 
Malaysia) and Japan are top trade partners, together accounting for nearly a 60% of 
Taiwan’s exports13. In other words, if Taiwan does not join the TPP and/or the RCEP, 
its industry sectors may be put in competitive disadvantage, even replaced by those 
in the TTP or the RCEP, due to suffering higher tariffs and non-tariff barriers in the 
regional market [ROC Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2015c, 2015d]. At the same time, 
13 Trade statistics taken from ”TPP introduction” compiled by ROC Ministry of Economic Affairs 
[2015a, 2015b].
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without being in part of the TPP and the RCEP or having FTAs with the participants 
of these new regional trade agreements, Taiwan may also lose attractiveness to in-
vestments of foreign and local enterprises in the future, which can further worsen 
the development of industry sectors [Ye Changcheng, 2014, pp. 32–35; Shi Huici, Yan 
Huixin, Ye Changcheng, Hu Junan, 2014, pp. 145–184; Wu Yuying, 2014, pp. 24–28; 
Gu Yinghua, Lin Junfu, 2014, pp. 185–212; Legislative Yuan, Budget Center, 2014].
It is known in Taiwan that taking part in the RCEP and the TPP will help increase 
political and economic cooperation between Taiwan and the member states, explore 
new markets, and reduce economic dependence on China. However, China’s attitude 
is the key of door for Taiwan to join the TPP and the RCEP. The TPP and the RCEP 
follow the rule of consensus decision for membership permission. Since China is 
the RCEP member state, Taiwan’s participation clearly depends on China’s decision. 
On the contrary, Taiwan’s joining the TPP is much more promising in nearly future 
because the first round of the TPP negotiation has been completed and China is 
not a member state14. Although Taiwan has started consultation with the US about 
participating in the second round of the TTP negotiation [Trade Promotion…, 2015; 
Udn.com, 2015; CNA News, 2015]15, it may need to conclude the Trade and Invest-
ment Framework Agreement with the US in advance, which requests further market 
opening to the US. Meanwhile, even though China is not currently a member state 
of the TTP, it still can impede the TPP decision of membership offer to Taiwan via 
putting pressure on the US or other member states.
Since the factor of China makes it more difficult to Taiwan’s participation in re-
gional affairs, the Ma administration attempted to improve cross-strait relations 
through economic cooperation in order to mitigate such predicament. However, 
the Ma administration’s cross-strait policy was called into questioned by Taiwan’s 
society. The opponents stated that the Ma administration overestimated positive 
economic benefits of the ECFA and oversee possible negative impact on domestic 
economy. For example, China’s generous economic offers may reduce incentives 
of reforming industrial structure and subsequently force Taiwan to more subject 
to China’s market. As a result, Taiwan’s international autonomy will be gradually 
eroded [Luo ZhiZheng, 2010, Wu Rongyi, 2010]. Some studies have pointed out 
that resulting benefit of the ECFA is not as much as expected [Gu Yinghua, Gao 
14 Although the Obama administration continues to push the US Congress to verify the TPP after 
the new “Trade Promotion Authority” Act passed, the time of TPP taking in force is uncertain because 
the presidential nominees of both the Republican and the Democrats is now in opposition to the TPP 
in the election campaign.
15 “Trade Promotion Authority” Act has been passed by the Senate. It is currently under examination 
by the House of Representatives [Trade Promotion…, 2015; Udn.com, 2015; CNA News, 2015].
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Junyi, 2014, pp. 57–88; Tong Zhenyuan, 2014]. Besides, the opponents argued that 
people do not have throughout understanding of the impacts of the ECFA because 
of its opaque reviewing procedure. The ineffective communication between the Ma 
administration and domestic dissenters eventually led to the “Sunflower Movement” 
that took place on 18 March, 2014, resulting in suspension of proving the “Cross-
strait Agreement on Trade in Services” signed in 2013 in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan. 
However, the emergence of the Sunflower Movement is not only showed a rejection 
to the Ma administration’s cross-strait economic policy, but it also reveals the lack of 
consensus in Taiwan about further economic liberalization. In other words, Taiwan 
is not ready for tackling the comprehensive impacts of the TPP and the RCEP at the 
moment. In the Asia-Pacific region, Taiwan’s FTA network is weak, with only FTAs 
with Singapore and New Zealand and the ECFA with China. This means that Taiwan 
relatively lacks stakes for bilateral as well as multilateral FTA negotiations, which 
consequently place greater difficulty in front of Taiwan on the way to the TPP and 
the RCEP. Moreover, although Taiwan currently starts to review and adjust economic 
institutions, the existing regulations are still far from matching the standards proposed 
by the TPP. Substantial adjustments of domestic legal and economic infrastructures 
for greater market liberalization will certainly generate impact on some of domestic 
industry sectors and their employment and inevitably give rise to social and political 
conflicts. These are the challenges standing in front of Taiwan’s participation in the 
regional economic integration.
Conclusion
International security and the economic situation in the Asia-Pacific region is 
undergoing a structural change, but this change is a mix of security conflicts and 
economic integration and competition. From the viewpoint of regional security, 
though the related claimants call for peaceful settlement of the territorial disputes 
in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, but with China’s growing strength 
and substance to assert territorial sovereignty, other related parties such as Japan, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam have actively counterbalanced China’s actions in the two 
taters. This development also urged the United States to implement more explicitly 
the policy of rebalancing in Asia with increasing military activities in cooperation 
with the allies and related parties in East Asia to show its determination of returning 
to Asia. Although the risk of military conflict is increasing, the current status remains 
at the stage of fighting without splitting. However, the result of South China Sea 
Arbitration clearly shows international society that China’s assertive actions in the 
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South China Sea is without any legitimacy in terms of international law. Even though 
China publicly refutes the result, it is put in the relatively disadvantageous position 
in coping with the South China Sea issues in the multilateral as well as bilateral 
levels under more international pressures. The result of the arbitration in fact gives 
rise to a new condition of bargaining which may influence the existing international 
interactions in the region. Since Taiwan’s territorial claim is also refuted by the result 
of the arbitration, Taiwan has to modify the current discourses and measures of 
protecting sovereignty to secure its national interest and prevent disadvantage that 
China now faces. In the tone of peaceful settlement of the disputes, Taiwan on the 
one hand must reinforce the legal argumentation on sovereignty claims and continues 
effective governing measures over its islands in the South China Sea. On the other 
hand, in addition to commonly developing and conserving marine resources, Taiwan 
can contribute more on non-traditional security, such as marine environmental pro-
tection, scientific studies, and humanitarian aid, which can help Taiwan to establish 
international reputation of good governance and peacemaker in the South China Sea. 
Though Taiwan and China are the only two countries simultaneously involving in the 
two troubled waters in the region, Taiwan is generally a passive actor. Nonetheless, 
increasing involvements of the United States, Japan, and regional countries engen-
der a strategic opportunity for Taiwan to more actively participate in consultation, 
bargaining, and cooperation over the issues of the two waters. Against this strategic 
background, Taiwan has to grasp such chance to concretely demonstrate its stance 
and actively take advantage of transforming dynamics of interactions among the 
related parties so as to its critical role of regional security.
On regional economic integration, the establishment of the TPP and the RCEP 
not only reflects the member states’ desires to advance national development but also 
shows their attempts to attain autonomy and advantage in the process of the Asia-Pa-
cific regional economic integration. Although the TPP and the RCEP seem competing 
with each other, the overlap of their member states in fact renders possibility that 
the two integrating mechanisms may eventually converge toward a single free trade 
area. So, it is foreseeable that regional industry value chains will also undergo a sea 
change, and undoubtedly each regional country will seek for the best positions of the 
chains in order to avoid being marginalized and substituted in the integration process. 
However, Taiwan is relatively lagging behind with regard to the number of FTAs signed 
with regional countries, and it currently maintains its role in international trade and 
industry chains largely via APEC and WTO mechanisms and bilateral economic 
relations established in the past few decades. Participating the TPP and the RCEP 
which requests opening domestic market will unavoidably bring painful economic 
and societal frustrations. Nevertheless, it will compel industrial structure transition 
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and manufacture technology upgrading, which will eventually carry out fruitful 
economic outcome. Although there have been many doubts about, even objections 
to, the ECFA in Taiwan, the implementation of the ECFA in appropriate way is still 
an important part in Taiwan’s participation in new wave of the Asia-Pacific regional 
integration. Before joining in the TPP and the RCEP, besides continuing to reinforce 
bilateral investment and trade with the member states of the two integration system, 
it is also very important for Taiwan to power up its industrial innovation and improve 
conditions of domestic employment and investment market in order to maintain 
advantage in the changing economic landscape. Thus, Taiwan now is facing a critical 
moment in changing regional security and economic environment.
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